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DISCONNECTING THE ITC’S JURISDICTION:
WHY SECTION 337 DOES NOT GRANT THE
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION THE
POWER TO POLICE THE INTERNET
FOR UNFAIR IMPORTATION
INTRODUCTION
First, there was Napster—the notorious internet music service al-
lowing unregulated access and downloading of copyright-protected
music was shut down in 2001 after two years of high profile litigation.1
Then came Grokster, fighting its way up to the U.S. Supreme Court
and setting the precedent that makers of peer-to-peer software could
be held liable for inducing copyright infringement.2  After Grokster
came Lime Wire, which was shut down in 2010 after several record
companies sued the software developer for copyright infringement.3
These three companies show the power of the internet to easily allow
infringement of intellectual property rights; however, each of these
defendants have one common denominator: They were all located
within the United States.  The rise of digital technology has created
headaches for intellectual property rights holders requiring costly liti-
gation to stamp out new avenues of unfair importation.  However,
websites outside the United States have sprouted, making content
available for download outside the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.  The
United States government does have an agency for fighting unfair im-
portation of goods which damage domestic industry.  Sometimes “un-
fair importation” can be referred to as “internet piracy” or “illegal
downloading.”  This Comment uses the term “unfair importation.”
The United States International Trade Commission (ITC) was cre-
ated in 1930 as a remedy to counter unfair importation.4  The law vest-
ing the ITC with its powers limited the agency to only enjoin
importation of physical goods5 because the technology had not yet
been created to enable digital importation.  As technology progressed
1. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001).
2. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd, 545 U.S. 913, 941 (2005).
3. See Arista Records LLC v. Lime Grp. LLC, 784 F. Supp. 2d 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
4. Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590, amended by Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (renaming the United States Tariff Commission to the United
States International Trade Commission).
5. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012).
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and computers became more widespread, the ability for information
to move across international borders became trivially easy.  This
presents the ITC with a dilemma: How does it fight unfair importation
on the internet?  Recent cases wrestled with the issue of whether the
ITC has the power to regulate online importation and the internet.6
The ITC believes that it possesses the jurisdiction to regulate infringe-
ment occurring on the internet.7  This Comment argues that section
337 of the Tariff Act of 1930,8 the statute governing the ITC’s author-
ity, does not grant the ITC the power to enforce exclusion orders en-
joining unfair importation over the internet9 because the U.S.
Supreme Court distinguishes between digital data (not referred to in
the statute) and tangible goods (expressly addressed by the statute).10
The use of the word “articles” in section 337 limits the scope of the
ITC’s authority to physical goods.  The ITC cannot rely on its im-
proper interpretation of “articles” under section 337 because no ambi-
guity exists in the statute which the agency can interpret.11  Allowing
the ITC to read “articles” to encompass digital data raises substantial
First Amendment questions.12  Finally, the dissenting opinion argu-
ments do not stand up to scrutiny.13
Part II presents an extensive background of relevant information
for this Comment.14  This Part provides (1) a brief history and back-
ground of the architecture of the Internet and how the Internet en-
ables importation into the United States; (2) a foundation of
administrative law relevant to this issue, as well as a brief history of
the ITC; and (3) a description of the ITC’s jurisdiction and authority
to regulate importation into the United States.  Part III analyzes and
applies background information, arguing that the ITC should not have
the authority to regulate unfair importation on the internet.15  Part III
also analyzes U.S. Supreme Court precedent distinguishing between
digital data and tangible goods.  Further, Part III argues that no ambi-
guity exists when analyzing the word “articles” in context with section
337 and then considers the First Amendment implications of a broad
6. See, e.g., ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. ITC, 810 F.3d 1283, 1290, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
7. See id. at 1299.
8. 19 U.S.C. § 1337.
9. The ITC issues exclusion orders, excluding a particular good from being imported or enter-
ing into the United States. OFFICE OF RESPONSE & RESTORATION, EXCLUSION ORDERS (1999),
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2310-006a.pdf.
10. See infra notes 159–70 and accompanying text. R
11. See infra notes 171–85 and accompanying text. R
12. See infra notes 186–214 and accompanying text. R
13. See infra notes 215–39 and accompanying text. R
14. See infra notes 18–154 and accompanying text. R
15. See infra notes 155–239 and accompanying text. R
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reading section 337.  Finally, Part III offers counterarguments to
Judge Newman’s dissent, arguing that the dissent mischaracterizes the
statute, and its comparisons to copyright are distinguishable.  Part IV
discusses the impact and ramifications of this interpretation of section
337 and offers a Congressional solution.16  Part V concludes and reit-
erates the Federal Circuit’s holding that the ITC does not possess the
power to police unfair importation over the internet.
II. BACKGROUND
This Part gives a brief description of the internet, the current state
of administrative agency law, and its application in the ITC.  It then
describes the ITC, as well as cases questioning the ITC’s jurisdiction
to fight unfair importation.17
A. The Internet
The internet needs no introduction.  Its growth and use has facili-
tated the exchange of information and several of the world’s most val-
uable brands.18  This section discusses (1) the origins of the internet;
(2) the basic underlying architecture of the network; and, (3) how
computers communicate using that architecture and how those com-
munications may lead to unfair importation.
Several computers connected together create a “network.”19  These
computers can then share resources, such as processing power or data
stored on a hard drive, while working to accomplish a task requested
by the user.20  The computers send electrical signals between each
other, each requesting the other to perform a specific function or ask-
ing for data.21  As an idea, the “internet” is a “network of networks,”
connected and exchanging electrical signals and sharing resources to
accomplish tasks requested by the users.22  Computers send these sig-
nals, known as “bits,” to each other, all across the internet.23  Each
16. See infra notes 240–49 and accompanying text. R
17. See infra notes 65–154 and accompanying text. R
18. See The World’s Most Valuable Brands—2016 Ranking, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/
powerful-brands/list/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2017).
19. See SIMON HAYKIN & MICHAEL MOHER, INTRODUCTION TO ANALOG AND DIGITAL COM-
MUNICATION 6–12 (2d ed. 2007).
20. Id. at 6–8.
21. Id. at 7–8.
22. Internet Interconnections, EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR NETWORK & INFO. SEC., https:/
/www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/critical-information-infrastructures-and-services/internet-infrastruc
ture/inter-x (last visited Feb. 8, 2017).
23. See HAYKIN & MOHER, supra note 19, at 9.  A bit is a single electrical signal at one mo- R
ment in time. See CHARLES E. MACKENZIE, CODED CHARACTER SETS, HISTORY AND DEVELOP-
MENT 12 (1980).  The communication channels referenced can be a wired Ethernet connection,
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individual network is connected to a “router” that acts as an interme-
diary by directing bits to the proper path in order to reach their
destination.24
A group of multiple bits is called a bit “string.”25  A bit string often
becomes so long and complex that humans cannot efficiently interpret
these instructions.26  However, computers can be programmed to re-
peatedly and efficiently interpret strings of bits, translating them into
something that humans can understand.27  These bit strings translate
into instructions for the computer to carry out, or some data for the
computer to use.28
To send bits across the internet, a computer sends signals from its
network to a router.29  The router determines the best path for the bits
to take and directs the signal to follow that route.30  The bits travel
along that route to their destination at another computer or server,31
and the data may be a request for the other computer or server to
send more data (e.g., a web page or file), or it may be uploading a file
for other computers to access and download.32
Computers determine the destination of information using the In-
ternet Protocol address (IP address).33  Every computer, smartphone,
tablet, server, and other devices connected to the internet has a
unique IP address,34 a small part of which contains a code that identi-
fies the geographic location.35  IP addresses do not contain any En-
Wi-Fi, cellular, or over any other suitable network for transmitting bits. See JAMES GRIM-
MELMANN, INTERNET LAW: CASES & PROBLEMS 28 (2016) (describing several types of “network
links” for communications between computers).
24. Rus Shuler, How Does the Internet Work?, STANFORD U. (2002), https://web.stanford.edu/
class/msande91si/www-spr04/readings/week1/InternetWhitepaper.htm.
25. GRIMMELMANN, supra note 23, at 25.  A simple “string” refers to a group of arbitrary R
character used by the computer. A “bit string” is a string of bits.
26. See id. at 18 (“Using ASCII, it’s possible to convert arbitrary text into bits and vice
versa.”).  ASCII is the American Standard Code of Information Interchange; a system com-
puters use for encoding letters as binary numbers. Id.  When translated from bits, computers
carry out the instructions and the computer performs some function. Id. at 19.  Some examples
include playing a sound or displaying an image. Id. at 19–21.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 24.  However, software engineers do not write code using 1’s and 0’s. Engineers
write code in a language developed to allow for translation by a computer into bits. See id.
29. Id. at 29.
30. Shuler, supra note 24. R
31. Id.  Servers are large computers that act only to respond to requests from users.  Servers
can be public (e.g., website, email, or file server) or private.
32. TIM BERNERS-LEE, WEAVING THE WEB: THE ORIGINAL DESIGN AND ULTIMATE DESTINY
OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB 222–28 (2000).
33. ICANN, BEGINNER’S GUIDE TO INTERNET PROTOCOL (IP) ADDRESSES 4 (2011), https://
www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/ip-addresses-beginners-guide-04mar11-en.pdf.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 6.
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glish text, making them difficult for humans to immediately identify.
To help users navigate the internet, engineers created the Domain
Name System (DNS) to create English “translations” of IP ad-
dresses.36  A domain name is simply the website typed into the URL
bar in any browser.37  Internet browsers are programmed to translate
that domain name into the IP address before sending that request.38
The internet is filled with content, providing news, sports, videos,
music, and so much more;39 however, many websites offer content for
download or use that infringes on U.S. intellectual property.40  That
content is often hosted by web servers outside of the United States,
thus U.S. courts are unable to help IP owners because it does not have
jurisdiction over those foreign web servers.41  The entertainment in-
dustry frequently supports legislation simplifying the process of seiz-
ing or shutting down websites that enable piracy by distributing
copyrighted content.42  Because these computers often sit outside the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts, they are difficult to shut down.43
In 2014, Columbia Pictures authorized the release of the feature
film The Interview, a comedy film about two comedians attempting to
assassinate Kim Jong-Un.44  One month before the scheduled release
of the film, Sony, Columbia Picture’s parent company, found that
hackers had gained administrator-level access to its private computer
network and stole millions of confidential files, emails, employment
36. Glossary, ICANN, https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/glossary-2014-02-03-en#d (last
visited Jan. 1, 2017).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., ESPN, www.espn.com (last visited Jan. 17, 2017) (delivers sports); NPR,
www.npr.org/sections/news (last visited Jan. 17, 2017) (delivers news); PANDORA INTERNET RA-
DIO, www.pandora.com (last visited Jan. 17, 2017) (delivers music); YOUTUBE,
www.youtube.com (last visited Jan. 17, 2017) (delivers videos).
40. See Gregory Babcock & Jason Duaine Hahn, A Beginner’s Guide to the Pirate Bay Con-
troversy, COMPLEX (Jan. 31, 2015), http://www.complex.com/pop-culture/2015/01/the-pirate-bay-
down-and-up-again/.
41. Id.
42. SOPA/PIPA: Internet Blacklist Legislation, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://
www.eff.org/issues/coica-internet-censorship-and-copyright-bill (last visited Jan. 14, 2017).
43. For example, ‘The Pirate Bay’ was a notorious website in Sweden that allowed users to
illegally download millions of movies, television shows, music, and software files. Swedish law
enforcement eventually shut down the website by physically disconnecting the servers and crimi-
nally charging the site’s owners for promotion of copyright infringement. See Timothy J. Sep-
pala, The Pirate Bay Shutdown: The Whole Story (So Far), ENGADGET (Dec. 16, 2014), http://
www.engadget.com/2014/12/16/pirate-bay-shutdown-explainer/.
44. THE INTERVIEW (Columbia Pictures 2014).  The comedy film chronicled Dave Skylark, a
talk show host (Franco), and his producer Aaron Rapoport (Rogen), as they journeyed to North
Korea to interview Supreme Leader Kim Jong-Un.  In the film, the Central Intelligence Agency
approaches the two friends and orders them to assassinate Kim Jong-Un and overthrow the
communist dictatorship.
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records, and internal memoranda.45  The FBI quickly determined that
the Guardians of Peace, hackers with computers located in North Ko-
rea, most likely hacked Sony following Kim Jong-Un’s orders, in retal-
iation for the upcoming release of The Interview.46
Among the leaked files from the Sony hack was an internal memo
about the ITC.47  Sony and the Motion Picture Association of
America (MPAA) had requested legal memoranda from major law
firms about using the ITC’s exclusion orders to stop importation of
copyrighted materials into the United States via the internet.48  Sony
and the MPAA wanted to use the ITC’s power to issue exclusion or-
ders to stop importation of their intellectual property.49  The memo
detailed a hypothetical “site-blocking order” that the ITC could use to
block internet website domains that delivered infringing content.50
Such an action, however, would require an improper reinterpretation
of the ITC’s agency powers.
B. Administrative Agency Law
This Section provides a brief summary of the current state of United
States administrative law.  In addition, this Section also shows the his-
tory of the ITC, the scope of the ITC’s jurisdiction, and two cases that
help better define the scope of that jurisdiction.
1. A Brief Overview of Administrative Law
An administrative agency derives its powers and authority from the
organic statute that creates it.51  Congress delegates some power (leg-
islative, executive, or judicial) to the agency to make rules, adjudicate
disputes, investigate, fact-find, or some combination of these responsi-
45. Brooks Barnes & Nicole Perlroth, Sony Films Are Pirated, and Hackers Leak Studio Sala-
ries, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/03/business/media/sony-is-
again-target-of-hackers.html.  Administrative level access to a computer network allows access
to almost all files and records within a computer system.
46. Id.
47. Russsell Brandom, The MPAA Has a New Plan to Stop Copyright Violations at the Bor-
der, VERGE (Jan. 2, 2015, 12:53 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2015/1/2/7481409/the-mpaa-has-a-
new-plan-to-stop-copyright-violations-at-the-border.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Memorandum from Jenner & Block LLP & Adduci, Mastriani & Schaumberg, LLP to
MPAA 1 (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.scribd.com/doc/250191712/Use-of-the-ITC-to-Block-For
eign-Pirate-Websites.  This is the actual memorandum submitted to the MPAA.
51. GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 5 (7th ed. 2013).
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bilities.52  Final agency decisions or interpretations of an organic stat-
ute generally receive deference from the judiciary.53
The seminal case for agency deference is Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council.54  The test articulated in Chevron looks at:
(1) whether there is an ambiguity within the agency’s organic statute
which needs interpretation; and (2) whether the agency’s interpreta-
tion is a permissible construction of the agency’s organic statute.55  If a
court finds no ambiguity under step one of the Chevron test, it cannot
defer to the administrative agency’s interpretation because the intent
of Congress is clear.56  However, if a reviewing court finds an ambigu-
ity in the statute, it treats this ambiguity as an implied delegation of
power from Congress for the agency to interpret its own organic stat-
ute.57  Once the court finds an ambiguity, a reviewing court then de-
termines whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.58  If an
agency’s interpretation does not go against its organic statute, it will
be held as reasonable.  While there is some unpredictability to the
Chevron test, it has allowed for administrative agencies to make deci-
sions faster than Congress by giving agency actions reasonable
deference.59
An administrative agency may interpret the scope of its own juris-
diction.  The U.S. Supreme Court held in City of Arlington v. FCC60
that “[n]o matter how it is framed, the question a court faces when
confronted with an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers is
always, simply, whether the agency has stayed within the bounds of its
statutory authority.”61  The Court went on to reason that interpreta-
tions of an agency’s “jurisdiction” do not preclude a court from apply-
ing Chevron deference simply because they concern procedural
aspects of a statute.62  The Court reasoned that under normal judicial
circumstances, a “meaningful line” exists between jurisdiction and
substantive questions, but for cases involving Chevron deference, no
difference exists.63  The ITC operates as an administrative agency
52. See id.; see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371–72 (1989) (holding that Con-
gress may delegate limited authority to administrative agencies).
53. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984).
54. Id. at 842–43.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 842–43
58. Id. at 843.
59. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
60. 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
61. Id. at 1868.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1868–69.
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under the executive branch.  Therefore, the Administrative Proce-
dures Act section 551 governs its procedures.64
2. The History of the ITC
The ITC was formed in 1916 and was originally named the United
States Tariff Commission.65  Congress created the Tariff Commission
to investigate economic transaction costs of tariffs and customs for
various industries importing into the United States.66  After making
investigatory findings, the Tariff Commission would advise the Presi-
dent to help draft trade proposals between the United States and for-
eign nations.67
In 1922, Congress amended the ITC’s organic statute, granting it
greater investigatory powers in a response to the threat of European
manufactures undermining U.S. industries after World War I.68  The
agency’s mission became “to insulate United States manufacturers
from the post-World War I revitalization of European industry.”69
However, the agency lacked any adjudicatory powers and still acted to
advise the Executive Branch.70
In response to declining economic conditions at the end of the
1920s, Congress passed the Tariff Act of 1930.71  Section 337 of the
Tariff Act of 1930 authorized the ITC to conduct investigations into
unfair importation and provided remedies to help American indus-
tries and labor.72  The new law codified the procedures and powers of
the ITC.73  The new law also defined methods of unfair importation
and subsequently declared them illegal.74
64. See 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2012); see also FAQS–Intellectual Property, U.S. INT’L TRADE COM-
MISSION, https://usitc.gov/faqs/intellectual_property_faqs.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2017).
65. Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, § 700, 39 Stat. 756, 795.  The Trade Act of 1974
renamed the Tariff Commission to the International Trade Commission. See Pub. L. No. 93-618,
§ 171, 88 Stat. 1978, 2009 (1975).  The agency retained all its old powers and received more clear
instructions of its duties to investigate unfair trade practices. See 19 U.S.C. § 2101 (1976).
66. See 19 U.S.C. § 2252 (2012).
67. See Abraham Berglud, The Tariff Act of 1922, 13 AM. ECON. REV. 14, 17 (1923) (explain-
ing how the Tariff Commission obtained the right and duty to propose recommendations for
changes in rates of duty to the President).
68. See Tariff Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-318, 42 Stat. 858; see also J. Stephen Simms, Com-
ment, Scope of Action Against Unfair Import Trade Practices Under Section 337 of the Tariff Act
of 1930, 4 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 234, 240 (1982).
69. Simms, supra note 68, at 240. R
70. Id. at 241.
71. Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (1930) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202–1683g (2012)).
72. 19 U.S.C. § 1337.
73. Id.
74. Id. § 1337(a)(1)(A).
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Section 337 granted the ITC the authority to investigate allegations
of unfair importation and issue exclusion orders to remedy any illegal
activity,75 under which the ITC could now enjoin goods from entering
the United States.76  Since 1930, the ITC has routinely investigated
alleged unfair trade practices and issued many exclusion orders.77  Al-
though the President of the United States has the final authority to
approve these orders, they are rarely reversed.78
3. Section 337 Investigations
A section 337 investigation begins with a complaint from a party
alleging unfair trade practices.79  After the party files a complaint, the
ITC Commissioners examine the complaint to determine whether it
sufficiently alleges an unfair importation pursuant to the statute.80  If
the Commissioners vote to open an investigation, the offending par-
ties receive notice through the Federal Register.81  Once an investiga-
tion commences, the Administrative Procedures Act governs the
adjudicatory proceeding.82  An ITC investigation is similar to a civil
trial.83  The investigation involves separate stages of pleadings, mo-
tions, discovery, a Markman hearing (for patent infringement actions),
an evidentiary hearing, and post-hearing briefs.84
The Office of Unfair Import Investigations appoints its own attor-
ney during ITC investigations to represent the public interest at large,
not the two parties in dispute.85  If the general public stands to suffer
harm from unfair importation, the ITC will take note when consider-
75. Id. § 1337(d).
76. Id.  An exclusion order enjoins goods from importation into United States.  This Com-
ment will use the term “exclusion order” for simplicity.
77. See Section 337 Statistics, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.usitc.gov/
press_room/337_stats.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2017).
78. President Barack Obama vetoed an exclusion order that would have banned the importa-
tion of some GSM models of the Apple iPhone 4 for infringing on Samsung Electronic Co.’s
patents. See Brent Kendall & Ian Sherr, Obama Administration Vetoes Ban on Sale of Some of
Apple iPhones, iPads, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2013, 12:09 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424127887324136204578646192008412934.
79. 19 C.F.R. § 210.9(b) (2016).
80. Id. § 210.9(a).
81. See id. § 210.10(b).
82. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS—ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS 17 (2009), https://usitc.gov/intellectual_property/documents/337_faqs.pdf.
83. Id. at 2.
84. Id. at 2, 17.  A Markman hearing, named after Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc., 517
U.S. 370, 372 (1996), held that patent claim construction is for the judge to decide.
85. ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 82, at 2. R
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ing its decision of whether to issue an exclusion order.86  The attorney
for the public has the right to cross examine witnesses and submit a
post-hearing brief advocating its position for whether the commission
should issue an exclusion order.87  Although the ITC has had jurisdic-
tion to investigate unfair importation since the passage of the Tariff
Act of 1930, the ITC’s use of section 337 investigations began to sig-
nificantly increase during the 1980s.88
C. The ITC’s Jurisdiction
The ITC’s jurisdiction to police unfair importation has only recently
been questioned.89  Since 2010, several parties have appealed ITC de-
cisions and exclusion orders, claiming that interpretations of the lan-
guage in section 337 do not actually vest the agency with powers it
presumed to have since its inception.90  Specifically, respondents have
argued that the definition of “infringement” in section 337 only covers
direct infringement.91  Additionally, respondents have argued that the
word “articles” only covers tangible objects and does not encompass
digital files.92
United States patent law describes several theories of infringe-
ment.93  Direct patent infringement occurs when an unauthorized
party “makes, uses. . . or sells” the patented invention.94  Induced in-
fringement occurs when an unauthorized party encourages the pro-
duction or use of the patented invention.95  Contributory infringement
requires an unauthorized party to “offer[ ] to sell” a component of the
patented invention.96  The text of section 337 only states “infringe-
86. Louis S. Mastriani, U.S. Administrative Proceeds for Protection from Unfair Import Com-
petition: The Revitalization of Section 337, ADDUCI MASTRIANI & SCHAUMBERG LLP, http://
www.aduci.com/node/112 (last visited Feb. 11, 2017).
87. Id.
88. See Section 337 Statistics, supra note 77. R
89. See Suprema, Inc. v. ITC, 742 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
90. See infra notes 98–154 and accompanying text. R
91. See infra notes 98–123 and accompanying text. R
92. See infra notes 124–54 and accompanying text. R
93. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
94. See id. § 271(a) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any
patented invention . . . infringes the patent.”).
95. See id. § 271(b) (“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an
infringer.”).
96. See id. § 271(c) (“Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into
the United States a component of a patented machine . . . constituting a material part of the
invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringe-
ment of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.”).
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ment” and does not specify the type of infringement it declares illegal
and prohibits.97  The Federal Circuit addressed this question in 2013.
1. The Suprema Case and Defining “Infringement”
In Suprema, Inc. v. ITC,98 Suprema, Inc., a Korean company, was
investigated and subsequently barred from importing its goods into
the United States.  The company designs and manufactures several
products for access control and authentication of employees, including
biometric fingerprint scanners,99 and imports its products into the
United States for customers to purchase and use.100  The biometric
scanner could be programmed to recognize fingerprints and grant or
deny access.101  Crossmatch Technologies (Crossmatch) is a Florida
corporation and the owner of several U.S. patents relating to biomet-
ric scanning devices.102  Crossmatch designs and manufactures similar
authentication security devices and directly competes with
Suprema.103
In 2010, Crossmatch filed a complaint with the ITC against
Suprema and Mentalix, Inc., a software company that programmed
biometric security devices.104  Crossmatch alleged that Suprema in-
fringed its patents for biometric security devices when Suprema im-
ported its products into the United States and programmed them with
software created by Mentalix.105  The ITC voted to open an investiga-
tion and held a hearing that ultimately resulted in an exclusion order
barring Suprema from importing biometric scanners into the United
States.106
Suprema appealed the ITC’s decision to the Federal Circuit.107
Suprema argued that its fingerprint sensors were imported into the
United States as part of a computer waiting to be programmed and
97. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012).
98. Suprema, Inc. v. ITC, 742 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2013); see About Suprema, SUPREMA,
https://www.supremainc.com/en/About_Suprema (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
99. Controlled Access Technology uses some sort of authentication (ID card, fingerprint, eye
scan, voice scan, etc.) to grant or deny access to certain facilities. See BioEntry Plus: Feature,
SUPREMA, https://www.supremainc.com/en/AccessControl-TimeandAttendance/Biometric/Bio
Entry-Plus (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See In re Certain Biometric Scanning Devices, Components Thereof, Assoc. Software &
Products Containing the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-720, USITC Pub. No. 4366, at 1 (Oct. 24, 2011)
(Final).
103. See Suprema, 742 F.3d at 1355.
104. See Suprema, Inc. v. ITC, 796 F.3d 1338, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1343–44.
107. Id. at 1344.
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that no actual infringement had occurred until the software was
loaded onto the device.108  Suprema also contended that the statute
only allowed direct infringement and the ITC did not have the author-
ity to police induced infringement.109  A fractured Federal Circuit
panel agreed, holding, over a dissent, to vacate the ITC’s exclusion
order.110  The panel reasoned that “an exclusion order based on a vio-
lation of section 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) may not be predicated on a theory
of induced infringement.”111  The majority reasoned that according to
the statute, an ITC exclusion order only applies to direct infringement
at the time of importation, and any indirect infringement falls outside
of the Commission’s authority.112  Judge Renya dissented in part, ar-
guing that this new reading of section 337 significantly narrowed the
authority of the Commission and “enable[s] circumvention of the le-
gitimate legislative objective of [the statute] to stop, at the border,
articles involved in unfair trade.”113
The ITC petitioned for a rehearing en banc to allow the entire Fed-
eral Circuit to hear the issue.114  Many major technology companies
filed amicus briefs for the hearing, some urging the reversal of the
panel’s holding to allow the ITC to continue operating as it had for
many years prior to Suprema.115
The en banc Federal Circuit agreed and reversed the panel’s rul-
ing.116  The en banc court held that the ITC possessed the authority
under section 337 to enforce induced infringement.117  The ITC found
that the definition of “infringement” is ambiguous because it has more
than one possible meaning.118  The Federal Circuit agreed that an am-
biguity existed, so the court then looked to step two of the Chevron
test.  The court found that the ITC’s interpretation of “infringement”
to include induced infringement was a reasonable construction of sec-
tion 337.119  “When Congress used the words ‘unfair methods of com-
108. Id. at 1347.
109. Id. at 1357.
110. Suprema, 742 F.3d at 1353.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1360.
113. Id. at 1375 (Reyna, J., dissenting).
114. See Suprema, Inc. v. ITC, No. 2012-1170, 2014 WL 3036241, at *1 (Fed. Cir. May 13,
2014).
115. See Aebra Coe, Fed. Circ. Reverses Ruling Narrowing ITC’s Patent Authority, LAW360
(Aug. 10, 2015, 3:49 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/689173/fed-circ-reverses-ruling-narrow
ing-itc-s-patent-authority.
116. See Suprema, Inc. v. ITC, 796 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc).
117. Id. at 1352 (“The Commission reasonably determined that its interpretation would fur-
ther the purpose of the statute.”).
118. Id.
119. Id.
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petition and unfair acts in the importation of articles,’ that language is
‘broad and inclusive and should not be limited to, or by, technical defi-
nitions of those types of act.’”120  The ITC took steps to interpret the
definition of “infringement,” and the court gave deference to that in-
terpretation.121  Since the legislative intent of the ITC was to fight un-
fair importation, giving “infringement” a wide interpretation allows
the agency to effectively carry out its intended purpose.122  Therefore,
the en banc Federal Circuit allowed the ITC to invoke Chevron defer-
ence when reading “infringement” because it would allow the ITC to
effectively carry out its intended purpose of fighting unfair importa-
tion.123  However, as electronic goods continue to become more main-
stream, the ITC has attempted to fight unfair importation on the
internet.
2. The ClearCorrect Appeal and Defining “Articles”
In 2006, Align Tech, Inc. sued OrthoClear, Inc. and several other
subsidiaries for unfair importation in the ITC.124  Align Tech alleged
that the “incremental positioning adjustment appliances” for ortho-
dontics infringed on its patented “Invisalign System.”125  Rather than
go through costly litigation, the parties settled and the ITC issued an
exclusion order, baring the infringing devices from importation into
the United States without a license.126
In its second case in front of the ITC, Align Tech alleged that
ClearCorrect Operating Systems, LLC, the successor to OrthoClear,
unfairly imported internet files that infringed its patents.127  After a
full investigation, the ITC held that ClearCorrect infringed on Align
Tech’s patents and violated section 337 by importing them into the
United States.128  The ITC issued an exclusion order, baring
ClearCorrect from “importing (including through electronic transmis-
sion)” products that infringed Align Tech’s several patents.129  The re-
120. Id. at 1350 (citing In re W. C. Von Clemm, 229 F.2d 441, 443, (C.C.P.A. 1955)).
121. Id.
122. Suprema, 796 F.3d at 1350.
123. Id. at 1352.
124. In re Certain Incremental Dental Positioning Adjustment Appliances & Methods of Pro-
ducing Same, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-562, 2011 WL 8883648 (Nov. 13, 2006) (Order).
125. See Align Tech., Inc. v. ITC, 771 F.3d 1317, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
126. Id.
127. See ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. ITC, 810 F.3d 1283, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
128. Certain Digital Models, Digital Data & Treatment Plans for Use in Making Incremental
Dental Positioning Adjustment Appliances, the Appliances Made Therefrom & Methods of
Making the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-833, USITC Pub. 2013-18437 (Apr. 3, 2014) (Final) [herein-
after Certain Digital Models].
129. See id. at *6.
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spondent, ClearCorrect, appealed the exclusion order to the Federal
Circuit.130
ClearCorrect’s appeal presented a monumental issue for the ITC,
namely whether the Commission has the statutory authority to issue
exclusion orders blocking unfair importation on the internet.131  The
ITC declared that it has the authority to police online unfair importa-
tion.132  Many internet companies worried that the ITC’s newly cre-
ated power to regulate the internet may lead to a legalized form of
censorship.133
The Federal Circuit held, over a dissenting opinion, that the ITC
receives no deference to its interpretation of the definition of “arti-
cles.”134  The panel wrote that Suprema was distinguishable because it
involved a single instance of induced patent infringement, while this
case concerned the definition of the word “articles.”135  The Tariff Act
of 1930 did not define “infringement” or specify whether the ITC may
police direct, indirect, or induced infringement.136  In contrast to the
issue in Suprema, the Tariff Act of 1930 interprets the word “articles”
as a tangible, material thing.137  The statute makes reference to many
other provisions that are only permissible if “articles” is a material
object.138
The majority also wrote that it is “difficult to see how one could
physically stop electronic transmissions at the borders under the cur-
rent statutory scheme.”139  The Federal Circuit also noted that digital
data could not be “forfeited” or “seized” at any border.140  None of
the uses of the word “article” in the text of the statute could be read
as ambiguous.141  The Federal Circuit wrote that under the Chevron
framework, the definition of “articles” is unambiguous and, therefore,
130. See ClearCorrect Operating, 810 F.3d at 1289.
131. Id. at 1288.
132. See Certain Digital Models, supra note 128. R
133. Rebecca McCray, ITC Tells Google Invisalign Case Won’t Cripple the Web, LAW360
(Feb. 20, 2015, 4:42 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/623541/itc-tells-google-invisalign-case-
won-t-cripple-the-web.
134. ClearCorrect Operating, 810 F.3d at 1300.
135. Id. at 1286 n.1.
136. See Suprema, Inc. v. ITC, 796 F.3d 1338, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (“There is no
indication that Congress, in 1988, meant to contract the Commission’s authority regarding patent
infringement. To the contrary, Congress said it was expanding Commission authority.”).
137. ClearCorrect Operating, 810 F.3d at 1290.
138. Id.; see also 19 U.S.C § 1337(i) (2012) (referencing “ports of entry” into the United
States).
139. ClearCorrect Operating, 810 F.3d at 1295.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1302.
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the analysis should stop there.142  The Federal Circuit, however, con-
tinued to apply step two of the Chevron test and concluded that the
ITC’s interpretation of “articles” was not reasonable.143
Under step two of the Chevron test, the “question for the court is
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute.”144  The Federal Circuit panel held that the ITC’s con-
struction of the statute was not permissible because it adopted a defi-
nition of “articles” from a 1924 dictionary and “generate[d] its own
definition, unrelated to the definition provided by the dictionary.”145
The ITC cited several other dictionaries in an attempt to support its
construction that digital files fall within the scope of “articles.”146
However, the Federal Circuit read the opinion and rejected it, stating
that the ITC opinion did not provide any evidence supporting why
these other dictionaries ought to be included.147  The Federal Circuit
also wrote that the ITC cites to several other dictionaries’ definitions,
yet failed to state “why they should not control.”148
The ITC appealed the panel decision for a rehearing by the en banc
Federal Circuit in late January 2016.149  The ITC asked for a reversal,
characterizing the issue as one of “exceptional importance.”150  Align
Tech also filed a petition.151
The Align Tech litigation presents a growing problem plaguing the
digital industries, which is the illegal downloading and pirating of in-
tellectual property.152  If these files sit on servers outside of the
United States, U.S. courts have no jurisdiction.153  Rights holders have
142. Id. at 1299–1300.
143. Id. at 1300.
144. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
145. ClearCorrect Operating, 810 F.3d at 1300.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Aarti Shah et al., ClearCorrect: ITC and Patentee Align Submit Petitions for Rehearing
En Banc, Asking Federal Circuit to Reconsider Whether the ITC Has Jurisdiction over Digital
Imports, GLOBAL IP MATTERS, (Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.globalipmatters.com/2016/01/29/
clearcorrect-itc-and-patentee-align-submit-petitions-for-rehearing-en-banc-asking-federal-circuit
-to-reconsider-whether-the-itc-has-jurisdiction-over-digital-imports#/page=1.
150. See Jack Newsham, ITC Seeks Full Fed. Circ. Review of Data-Blocking Authority,
LAW360, (Jan. 27, 2016, 11:19 PM), www.law360.com/articles/751618/itc-seeks-full-fed-circ-re
view-of-data-blocking-authority.
151. Id.
152. See generally Anthony G. Gorry, Many People Do Not View Music Sharing as Wrong, in
INTERNET PRIVACY 22 (James D. Torr ed., 2005).
153. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987) (holding that
courts cannot exercise jurisdiction over foreign corporations without an intentional targeting of
the jurisdiction in question).  Copyright holders can petition search engines to remove links to
infringing content from search results under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).
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little recourse when this occurs and often incur heavy revenue
losses.154  While the ITC acted to address the growing problem of un-
fair importation, its actions went beyond the statutory text of section
337 and the Federal Circuit correctly reversed its holding.
III. ANALYSIS
This Part analyzes relevant case law and argues that the ITC does
not have the power under its organic statute to remedy unfair impor-
tation over the internet.155  The U.S. Supreme Court makes a distinc-
tion between digital data and tangible objects and the ITC cannot
usurp that distinction.156  No ambiguity exists for the word “articles”
in the text of section 337, and, in addition, the statute does not grant
the ITC the power the implement an exclusion order from using third-
party companies.157  Finally, this Part opines that major First Amend-
ment concerns would arise if the ITC received the authority to police
unfair importation on the internet.158
A. Physical Articles vs. Digital Data
In its brief, the ITC argued that digital data is congruent to physical
articles.159  The U.S. Supreme Court addressed this issue of digital
data and physical objects in Riley v. California.160  In Riley, police ar-
rested the petitioner for possession of a firearm and searched his
pockets for dangerous objects.161  Riley possessed a smartphone, and
the police seized it, subsequently searching it for evidence without ob-
taining a warrant.162  Riley attempted to have the digital evidence ob-
tained from his phone suppressed at trial, arguing that the phone
search without a warrant was unreasonable and violated his Fourth
Amendment rights.163  The U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (2012).  However, this does not remove the copyrighted material from
access by users; it only removes the search engine result from appearing.  Additionally, com-
plainants in ClearCorrect could not use the DMCA provision because its claim concerned a
patent, not a copyright.
154. See Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 492 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Between
1999 and 2008, the recording industry as a whole suffered a fifty percent drop in both sales and
revenues, a figure plaintiffs attribute to the rise of illegal downloading.”).
155. See infra notes 159–239 and accompanying text. R
156. See infra notes 159–70 and accompanying text. R
157. See infra notes 171–85 and accompanying text. R
158. See infra notes 186–214 and accompanying text. R
159. See Petition of Appellee Int’l Trade Comm’n for Rehearing En Banc at 13–14, ClearCor-
rect Operating, LLC v. ITC, 810 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (No. 2014-1527).
160. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
161. Id. at 2480.
162. Id. at 2480–81.
163. Id. at 2481.
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about this issue and held that the seizure of Riley’s phone was unrea-
sonable and that the evidence obtained from it was not admissible
because the police did not have a warrant to search the device.164  The
Court distinguished between physical objects on a person (e.g., keys, a
wallet, or a notepad) from the digital data on a smartphone.165
The U.S. Supreme Court holding in Riley shows that digital data
must be treated differently than physical articles.166  The two concepts
are not synonymous, as digital data stored on a smartphone receives
greater protections under the Constitution.167  The ITC’s organic stat-
ute only states “articles” and does not reference digital data.168  Be-
cause the Supreme Court made this distinction, the ITC cannot
declare the two concepts equal to fulfill its legislative purpose.  This
would contradict the Supreme Court’s holding in Riley.  In ClearCor-
rect, the Federal Circuit’s panel holding maintained the distinction be-
tween digital data and physical articles set forth in Riley.169  The ITC
erred in its holding when it did not maintain the U.S. Supreme Court’s
distinction between digital data and physical articles.170  Therefore,
the Federal Circuit was correct in holding that the ITC does not pos-
sess the power to police unfair importation over the internet.  The dis-
tinction between physical articles and digital data, however, is not the
only reason that the Federal Circuit holding was correct; section 337’s
reference to “articles” is unambiguous and only applies to physical
articles.
B. No Ambiguity in the Interpretation of “Article”
Administrative agencies have often acted to interpret their own or-
ganic statutes,171 but when interpreting the law, statutory provisions
may not be read in isolation.172  The Supreme Court has held, “It is a
‘fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a stat-
ute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the
overall statutory scheme.’”173
164. Id. at 2495.
165. Id. 2484.
166. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489.
167. Id. at 2478.
168. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012).
169. See ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. ITC, 810 F.3d 1283, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013).
172. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492 (2015) (affirming that the language of a
statute must be read in context with the statute as a whole).
173. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000); see also Davis v.
Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989).
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Section 337 does not define “articles,” but a contextual reading
shows that its scope is only limited to tangible objects.174  The statute
was written in 1930 when digital data did not exist.175  Additionally,
the statute makes reference to several enforcement mechanisms that
only apply if the definition of “articles” is limited to physical objects
and does not include digital data.176  Section 337 states that the ITC
will notify the Secretary of the Treasury if it issues an exclusion or-
der,177 and the Treasury Department will, “upon receipt of such no-
tice, . . . through the proper officers, refuse such entry.”178  Digital
data cannot be easily inspected or “refused entry” by the government.
This is because of the massive volume of digital data entering the
country and the encrypted nature of some of that data rendering it
impossible to interpret.  In addition, data does not enter the United
States through any dedicated port.  This makes its inspection difficult
and time-consuming.  Assuming U.S. Customs Officers could inspect
digital data entering the United States, the sheer volume of data
would overwhelm the office.179
If the ITC could issue exclusion orders barring unfair importation
over the internet, it would need to use a digital filter programed to
stop access to a specific website.180  Private companies, or “internet
service providers” (ISPs), build and maintain the infrastructure for
computers to connect to the internet.181  By enforcing an exclusion
order, the ITC would force a third party to implement the filters,
rather than directing government officers to turn away goods at the
174. Tariff Act of 1930 § 337, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012).
175. See Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (1930).
176. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1).  For example, the ITC has listed exclusion orders for electric
pianos and smartphones which were found to infringe U.S. companies’ intellectual property.
Kevin Penton, ITC to Probe Samsung, LC, Others in Smartphone Patent Row, LAW 360 (May 6,
2016, 5:25 PM), https://www.law360.com.ezproxy.depaul.edu/articles/793500.
177. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1).
178. Id.
179. See generally CISCO SYS., THE ZETABYE ERA—TRENDS AND ANALYSIS (2016), http://
www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/visual-networking-index-vni/vni-
hyperconnectivity-wp.pdf.  As a means of comparison, the modern consumer computers hold
between 100 gigabytes, (1 billion bytes) to 3 terabytes (3 trillion bytes), depending on the model
purchased.  According to Cisco Systems’ White Paper, traffic moving around the internet will
except 1 billion gigabytes by the end of 2016. Id. at 1. This is 1021 or
1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 bytes of data.
180. See Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 628 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
181. See id. at 613.  An ISP is the “internet service provider” that allows you to connect to the
internet using some physical connection (usually through a cable or phone line).  There are many
ISPs in the United States.  Some examples include: Comcast, Time Warner Cable, AT&T, Ver-
izon, RCN, Cox, and Google Fiber. See Raymond Blockman, What Is an Internet Service Pro-
vider (ISP)?—Definition & Examples, STUDY.COM, http://study.com/academy/lesson/what-is-an-
internet-service-provider-isp-definition-examples-quiz.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2017).
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border.  Section 337 does not the vest in the ITC the power to enforce
exclusion orders through third parties.182  Section 337(d) only vests
the power to enforce exclusion orders through the Secretary of the
Treasury.183  The statute makes no reference to the ITC possessing the
power to exercise its authority to require third parties to enforce ex-
clusion orders.184
If the ITC receives the power to issue exclusion orders barring un-
fair importation over the internet, the method of implementation
presents technical challenges.  To enforce an exclusion order over the
internet, ISPs across the country must uniformly implement software
to filter specific content and remove it from the internet traffic enter-
ing the United States.  Some of these filters may block access to for-
eign websites in the United States.185  Denying access to internet
websites raises serious free speech questions and whether the govern-
ment violates the First Amendment by issuing exclusion orders.
C. First Amendment Considerations
A broad reading of “articles” would encompass digital data on the
internet and would allow the ITC to take steps to block access to in-
ternet websites.  Internet content is protected by the First Amend-
ment, and blocking access to websites raises large questions about
freedom of speech.186  This Section explores attempts by the legisla-
ture to enact laws regulating access to content on the internet and
these attempts are a minefield of First Amendment violations.187
In 2002, the Pennsylvania legislature passed a law giving the state
Attorney General the power to direct ISPs to block websites that dis-
played child pornography.188  In order to comply with the law, ISPs
implemented a system of filters to block users in the state of Penn-
sylvania from accessing websites displaying child pornography.189  The
law imposed criminal liability on ISPs that failed to comply with these
orders.190  The ISPs operated outside of Pennsylvania and routinely
182. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012).
183. Id. § 1337(i)(2) (“The Commission shall notify the Secretary of the Treasury of any order
issued under this subsection and, upon receipt of such notice, the Secretary of the Treasury shall
enforce such order in accordance with the provisions of this section.”).
184. Id.
185. See Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 635.
186. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 863 (1997) (“[T]he First Amendment denies Congress the
power to regulate the content of protected speech on the Internet.”).
187. See infra notes 188–214 and accompanying text. R
188. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 7621–7630 (2003); see Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 610 (holding the
Internet Child Pornography Act unconstitutional).
189. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 628.
190. Id. at 610.
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sent information into the state—even if not destined for any user
within the state.191  The Pennsylvania Attorney General moved to di-
rect ISPs to block many websites using several different methods of
filtering.192
The ISPs implemented three methods of compliance used to filter
the internet traffic: (1) DNS filtering; (2) IP filtering; or (3) URL fil-
tering.193  DNS filtering occurs when an ISP denies a request from a
user to access a specific domain.194  To implement DNS filtering, an
ISP programs its routers not to recognize a specific website when re-
quested by a user.195  For example, if an ISP removed its routers’ rec-
ognition of “google.com,” a user requesting data from “google.com”
would receive nothing or an error code.  IP filtering works by
programing routers not to send or receive data from a specific IP ad-
dress.196  Using IP filtering, if a user wished to navigate to
“google.com,” the computer would send data destined for the
“google.com” IP address.  The ISP’s router would stop data from be-
ing forwarded to “google.com” and stop data being sent from
“google.com” from reaching the user.  URL filtering requires more
than IP or DNS filtering.  URL filtering requires an ISP to place spe-
cial equipment to analyze internet traffic.197  If the filter finds a
blocked URL, it discards the request and does not allow the data to
complete its journey to the user.198  When used, each of these filters
removes access to internet web sites.199  If the blocked websites con-
tain protected speech, this process violates the First Amendment.
A local ISP, several website owners, and the American Civil Liber-
ties Union, filed a lawsuit alleging that this law violated multiple pro-
visions of the U.S. Constitution.200  The plaintiffs argued that the web
filter violated the First Amendment by “burdening a substantial
amount of lawful speech, establishing a system of secret censorship,
and failing to provide adequate procedural protections.”201  To sup-
191. Id.  Even temporary presence in a state, regardless of the final destination, is sufficient to
establish in personam jurisdiction. See generally Burnham v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604
(1990).
192. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 636.
193. Id. at 628.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 628.
199. Id.
200. See id. at 611.
201. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-3\DPL303.txt unknown Seq: 21 30-AUG-17 13:22
2017] DISCONNECTING THE ITC’S JURISDICTION 893
port their case, the ISPs relied on United States v. Playboy Entertain-
ment Group.202
Television programs are a form of protected free speech.203  The
Playboy case analyzed a law requiring that cable providers take steps
to block sexually oriented television programming or to schedule it
between the hours of 10:00 PM and 6:00 AM.204  Laws regulating
speech must be the “least restrictive means to further the articulated
interest.”205  The Court found the law at issue in Playboy was not the
“least restrictive” means for censoring speech.206  Therefore, the Su-
preme Court struck down the law as unconstitutional as applied be-
cause it violated the First Amendment.207
The Pappert court looked to Playboy for guidance on First Amend-
ment doctrine.208  The court found that the orders from the Penn-
sylvania Attorney General effectively blocked “in excess of 1,190,000
websites.”209  Of these blocked websites, only a handful contained
documented instances of child pornography.210  The court wrote, “Al-
though the inference could be drawn that making it more difficult to
access child pornography reduces the incentive to produce and dis-
tribute child pornography, this burden on the child pornography busi-
ness is not sufficient to overcome the significant suppression of
expression . . . .”211  The law was invalidated under the First Amend-
ment for being overly inclusive due to the large volume of websites
blocked that contained protected speech.212
The ITC interpreted its authority to issue exclusion orders for con-
tent imported over the internet.213  Using similar filtering techniques
as the ISPs in Pappert, an ITC exclusion order could potentially block
websites containing protected speech.  If the ITC issues an exclusion
order for a specific website, internet users in the United States would
not be able to access that entire website.  As demonstrated in Pappert,
202. Id. at 650 (citing United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 804 (2000)).
203. See Playboy Entm’t, 529 U.S. at 804.
204. Id. at 806.
205. Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
206. Playboy Entm’t, 529 U.S. at 827.
207. Id.
208. Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 650 (E.D. Pa. 2004)
209. Id.
210. Id. at 655 (“More than 1,190,000 innocent web sites were blocked in an effort to block
less than 400 child pornography web sites, and there is no evidence that the government made an
effort to avoid this impact on protected expression.”).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 611.
213. Certain Digital Models, supra note 128. R
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these methods often lead to blocking websites containing protected
speech.214
Because of the potential for serious First Amendment violations
stemming from exclusion orders, “articles” as used in section 337
should not be interpreted broadly.  Limiting the definition of “arti-
cles” to only include physical goods and exclude digital data quashes
these First Amendment questions before they arise.
D. Addressing the ClearCorrect Dissent
The ClearCorrect court held, over a dissenting opion, that the ITC’s
interpretation of “articles” was incorrect and that it does not encom-
pass digital data.215  The dissent argued that (1) the court should look
at the legislative intent of section 337 when interpreting “articles”; (2)
precedent cases in the Federal Circuit have held that software and
other digital data is material; and (3) laws can adapt and be applied to
advances in technology.216  However, when scrutinized, these argu-
ments do not retain their merit.
Judge Newman’s dissent in ClearCorrect focused on the legislative
intent of section 337 and argued that it showed how “articles” could
encompass digital goods.217  Citing Suprema, she reasoned that the
case reaffirmed the ITC’s “broad enforcement authority to remedy
unfair trade acts,” and that authority should govern here.218  Accord-
ing to Judge Newman, the ITC correctly held section 337 applies to
importing digital goods.219  She cited legislative history and reasoned
that “[t]he statute was designed to reach every type and form of unfair
competition arising from importation.”220
This argument incorrectly applied the Suprema holding to the issue
here.  The Suprema court analyzed the ITC’s definition when applied
to “infringe.”221  Looking at the legislative intent for guidance in
Suprema, the en banc Federal Circuit held that the ITC possessed the
authority to enforce exclusion orders for all types of infringement.222
However, the issue in ClearCorrect does not concern infringement; it
concerns the article that causes the infringement.  Both the statutory
text and the legislative history of section 337 define “articles” as noth-
214. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 650.
215. See ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. ITC, 810 F.3d 1283, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
216. Id. at 1304–06.
217. Id. at 1304–05 (Newman, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 1306 (Newman, J., dissenting).
219. Id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 1305 (Newman, J., dissenting).
221. Suprema, Inc. v. ITC, 796 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc).
222. Id.
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ing more than a physical good.  The ITC cannot extend the scope of
“article” to encompass digital data because the text of Section 337
does not allow it.  The context of section 337 points to the definition
of “article” being only a physical good.  Therefore, the argument that
legislative intent shows digital data was understood to be included in
the word “article” does not pass muster.
Judge Newman’s dissent also references several U.S. Supreme
Court and previous Federal Circuit opinions that contradict the hold-
ing that digital data is not considered an “article.”223  In 2009, the Fed-
eral Circuit addressed whether patented software was a “material or
apparatus” for patent infringement.224  The Federal Circuit held that a
patented software method was “material” for purposes of patent in-
fringement.225  Judge Newman’s argument rests on the assumption
that the term “material” equals “article.”
The dissent looked to the use of the word “material” in 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(c).226  Notably, however, the dissent omits the important words
that come after “material.”
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States . . . a mate-
rial or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constitut-
ing a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be
especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of
such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce
suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a con-
tributory infringer.227
When used in this context, “material” describes some object that is
designed for the sole purpose of infringement and has no other nonin-
fringing use.228  The dissent incorrectly assumes that the internet is a
“material” used to enable infringement that has no other noninfring-
ing use.  This assumption is fundamentally flawed because the internet
has thousands of noninfringing uses and enables significant commer-
cial activity.229  A court cannot equate “material” with “articles” be-
cause the internet has so many noninfringing uses—35 U.S.C. § 271(c)
requires the “material” to be only suited for purpose of infringe-
223. ClearCorrect Operating, 810 F.3d at 1307 (Newman, J., dissenting).
224. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
225. Id.
226. ClearCorrect Operating, 810 F.3d at 1307 (Newman, J., dissenting).
227. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2012) (emphasis added).
228. Id.
229. See What Is Ecommerce?, NETWORK SOLUTIONS, http://www.networksolutions.com/edu
cation/what-is-ecommerce/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2017).  The internet enables significant com-
merce through websites allowing visitors to buy, sell, trade, and advertise goods and services
from all over the world.  Some examples of internet commerce websites are: Amazon, eBay,
Alibaba, Craigslist, and Netflix.
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ment.230  In addition, if a court follows this logic and equates “article”
with “material” in the context of section 271(c), all users of the in-
ternet may be liable for infringement because they would use the “ma-
terial or apparatus” that enables unfair importation.  However, all
users of the internet are not infringers because the internet has many
noninfringing uses.
Judge Newman also emphasized that interpretations of statutes
often change with evolving technologies.231  Judge Newman gave the
example of how the Copyright Act, despite being written in 1909, eas-
ily adapted to the widespread use of radio, television, and film.232  In
1975, Twentieth Century Music Corporation sued a restaurant owner
for playing copyrighted music over his speakers at his business.233  The
music was broadcast from a radio station, which held licenses allowing
the performance and dissemination of the music on the radio.234  The
U.S. Supreme Court noted that while the law (at the time) did not
expressly state that music deserves copyright protection, the intention
of the law was to “stimulate artistic creativity,” and that “[w]hen tech-
nological change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copy-
right Act must be construed in light of this basic purpose.”235
Laws often adapt to advances in technology;236  however, the au-
thors of the Copyright Act wrote the law broadly, allowing almost all
forms of artistic expression, fixed in a tangible medium, to receive
protection.237  As technology progressed, musical recordings prolifer-
ated, and the U.S. Supreme Court found that extending copyright pro-
tection falls within the legislative intent of the statute.238  However,
the drafters of Section 337 only wrote certain provisions of the statute
broadly, explicitly crafting the ITC’s powers, scope of review, and
remedies.  The words in section 337 cannot be extended because other
provisions in the statute limit the definitions.  “Articles” cannot be
230. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
231. ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1307 (Newman, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 1306–07 (Newman, J., dissenting).
233. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 153 (1975).  Coincidentally,
Congress passed a new Copyright Act one year after this decision: The Copyright Act of 1976,
expressly grants music copyright projection. See Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codi-
fied at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–122 (2012)).
234. Aiken, 422 U.S. at 153.
235. Id. at 156.
236. See id.; see also Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 856 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding
that a video game can receive copyright protection).  Video games are not expressly mentioned
in the Copyright Act; however, it receives protection because they may be defined as “audiovi-
sual works.”
237. See 17 U.S.C. § 101.  While the Copyright Act expressly lists eligible forms of expression,
copyright protection has been extended to other forms expression.
238. Aiken, 422 U.S. at 163–64.
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extended to encompass digital data because the statutory provisions
limit its definition to physical objects.239
The drafters of section 337 wrote the law in narrow terms, so it can-
not be compared to the Copyright Act.  Section 337 granted limited
power and enforcement mechanisms to the ITC, while the Copyright
Act did not contain any limits on what expression receives protection.
With the narrow scope of the ITC’s powers, the dissent’s argument of
section 337 adapting to advances in technology does not have merit.
The statutory text shows that Congress did not grant the ITC any
open-ended powers that may be extended to encompass other chan-
nels of importation.
IV. IMPACT
Silicon Valley technology companies have consistently raised con-
cerns about any party’s ability, government or otherwise, to regulate
access to internet websites, often framing the issue as one of possible
infringement of the fundamental right to freedom of speech under the
Constitution.240  As ClearCorrect was pending in front of the Federal
Circuit, several major technology companies filed amicus briefs urging
the court to vacate the decision of the ITC and to hold the definition
of “articles” in section 337 is limited to physical goods.241  The ITC
has assured technology companies that if it receives the authority to
police the internet for unfair importation, there will not be a chilling
of free speech online.242
This Part explores the impact of the Federal Circuit’s decision to
limit the definition of “articles” to physical goods in both the short
term and long term.  In addition, this Part describes a possible con-
gressional solution to clarify whether the ITC receives the power to
regulate unfair importation over the internet.
A. Short Term Impact and Unintended Consequences
The immediate effect of the Federal Circuit limiting the definition
of “articles” to physical goods will be maintaining the status quo
239. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e)(1) (2012).
240. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. AirBNB, Amazon, AOL, Auction.com, eBay, Expedia,
Facebook, Gilt, Google, Groupon, IAC, Linked, Lyft, Monster Worldwide, Netflix, Practice Fu-
sion, Rackspace, reddit, Salesforce.com, Sidecar, SurveyMonkey, TripAdvisor, Twitter, Uber
Technologies, Inc., Yelp, Yahoo!, and Zynga all signed onto a brief against the ITC’s expanded
authority. See Brief of the Internet Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants and Urg-
ing Reversal, ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. ITC, 810 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (No. 2014-
1527), 2014 WL 5427858.
241. See, e.g., Brief of the Internet Ass’n, supra note 240, at 6. R
242. McCray, supra note 133. R
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within the ITC.  The Federal Circuit’s holding did not invalidate or
change section 337; it only struck down an interpretation of the word
“article” and reinstated the older definition.243  The ITC will continue
to exclude physical articles being imported into the United States.
However, The Federal Circuit’s holding will have some unintended
consequences.  By construing “articles” narrowly, the Federal Circuit
has effectively created a loophole for illegally downloading copy-
righted content from foreign websites.  The Federal Circuit removed
the ability for injured parties to take steps to remove access to the
content damaging an American industry.244  Rights holders, however,
are not without remedy.  Rights holders still retain standing to sue in
any U.S. district court for monetary and statutory damages.245  In ad-
dition, rights holders may also sue in foreign jurisdictions to shut
down servers and remove the content from the internet.246
Holding “articles” to a narrow definition also avoids the potential
for a sudden and massive increase in litigation in front of the ITC.  If
the Federal Circuit held that “articles” included digital data imported
over the internet, the massive increase in litigation in front of the ITC
would render the legal process very inefficient and slow.
B. Major Drawbacks to the Broad Interpretation
A broad interpretation of “articles” creates many problems that
courts will need to adjudicate in the future.  This interpretation would
create more problems for the ITC while only delivering negligible
gains for the rights holders.  The ITC would run into imminent First
Amendment problems which it cannot adjudicate because its jurisdic-
tion is limited to unfair importation, and it is not an Article III
court.247  The ITC would also be overwhelmed with litigation if it at-
tempted to block a wide swath of internet content potentially pro-
tected by the First Amendment.  Additionally, circumventing blocking
mechanisms on the internet is trivially easy and will result in a meta-
phorical game of “whack-a-mole” by rights holders; when one website
243. ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1291.
244. Id.
245. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–122 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
246. See, e.g., Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act of 1988, c. 48 (Eng.), http://
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48/data.pdf.
247. Article III of the U.S. Constitution vests the judicial power in the courts to adjudicate
disputes arising under the “Constitution, or the laws of the United States.” See U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2.  The ITC can adjudicate disputes regarding unfair importation. However, it cannot adju-
dicate any other issues, otherwise it would be infringing on Article III court’s jurisdiction.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-3\DPL303.txt unknown Seq: 27 30-AUG-17 13:22
2017] DISCONNECTING THE ITC’S JURISDICTION 899
is shut down or blocked, another offering the same protected content
will quickly pop up.248
Interpreting the definition of “articles” to exclude digital data
quashes the inevitable First Amendment questions about whether ITC
exclusion orders blocking access to websites infringe on constitution-
ally protected speech.  Courts will not be subject to extensive litiga-
tion regarding this issue if the Federal Circuit interprets the definition
of “articles” narrowly.  Simultaneously, courts will be able to operate
more efficiently.
C. Amending Section 337
Congress can tackle this problem by amending section 337.  How-
ever, the statute would require several amendments to clarify the
ITC’s jurisdiction, how internet traffic will be monitored for the fu-
ture, and how internet service providers implement an exclusion
order.
Where the word “article” appears in 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a), Congress
should change the law to read “physical article.”  This would function-
ally eliminate litigation by parties attempting to expand the definition
to include digital data and allow the ITC to continue operating as it
has since the inception of section 337.
If Congress feels that the ITC should regulate the internet for unfair
importation, Congress should craft the language of the statute care-
fully to avoid any First Amendment issues.  Inserting a provision that
allows the ITC to issue exclusion orders barring internet importation
would require amending the statute to give the ITC jurisdiction over
internet service providers.  The statute would also need to clarify
which government agency implements the exclusion orders.  While
this statutory amendment remains a daunting task riddled with consti-
tutional traps, it is not impossible.
V. CONCLUSION
Internet and technology companies have created some of the most
valuable corporate brands in the world.249  The internet has become
248. The infamous internet drug marketplace The Silk Road is routinely seized by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, only to have copies of the website pop up on different URLs a few
hours later.  However, the Silk Road eventually folded as its users fled because of a fear of being
caught by the authorities. See Andy Greenburg, The Silk Road’s Dark-Web Dream Is Dead,
WIRED, (Jan. 14, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/01/the-silk-roads-dark-web-
dream-is-dead/.
249. See, e.g., The World’s Most Valuable Brands, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/powerful-
brands/list/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2017).
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ubiquitous and access has exploded, allowing information to propa-
gate quickly and at the touch of a button.  But alongside the rise of its
virtues, a dark network of websites promoting illicit activity has flour-
ished, which threatens to undermine the intellectual property rights of
artists and inventors.250
U.S. companies have no remedy within the structure of the ITC to
fight unfair importation on the internet.251  The Federal Circuit cor-
rectly held that the ITC does not possess the authority to police unfair
importation on the internet.  The ITC cannot usurp the distinction
created by the Supreme Court to further its legislative intent.  In addi-
tion, the text of section 337 only functions effectively when “articles”
is limited to physical goods.  The ITC has no power to enforce an ex-
clusion order over the internet because section 337 does not vest the
ITC with the authority to demand third-party ISPs implement block-
ing mechanisms.  In addition, the ITC possessing the authority to issue
exclusion orders over the internet raises significant potential First
Amendment problems.  As a matter of public policy, the ITC should
not receive that power.  Finally, the dissenting arguments do not hold
up when scrutinized.  If Congress feels that section 337 should be
amended, it must do so carefully to avoid any constitutional violations
and clearly delineate the powers the ITC possesses and can execute.
However, under the current section 337, the ITC does not possess the
power to police the internet for unfair importation.  Therefore, the
Federal Circuit correctly held that “articles” does not include digital
files.  This holding effectively pulled the plug on the ITC’s jurisdiction
over the internet.
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